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INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS BY AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBES

ABSTRACT
The American Indian tribes have a unique status in the law of the United States. They
are characterized as ‘sovereigns’ that predate the formation of the republic and possess
inherent powers and immunities. Their powers permit them to create and enforce laws
and generally to operate as autonomous governmental entities with executive,
legislative, and judicial branches. They enjoy immunity from suit and exemption from
federal and state constitutional provisions which protect individual rights. These
powers and immunities provide a connection between tribal governments and US
international human rights obligations. This essay explores this connection. It
examines whether the tribes may breach the international human rights obligations of
the US, whether the tribal violations may incur US international responsibility, and if
so, what consequences might result. It constructs an argument that the US has failed to
implement fully its international human rights obligations and that it can be held
internationally responsible for tribal violations of human rights. This argument leads to
policy recommendations for the US and tribal governments.
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A INTRODUCTION

Recent work on international human rights and indigenous peoples focuses on the
promotion and protection of ‘self-determination’, and on the development of group
rights. International human rights tribunals have decided cases dealing with the rights
of indigenous peoples while individual members of indigenous groups have
successfully challenged State violations of international human rights.1 The study of
indigenous peoples and international law has thus been limited to the development of
indigenous groups’ rights against the State.

This narrow approach to the overlap

between international human rights law, municipal law, and indigenous rights, neglects
potential consequences of individual human rights violations by indigenous groups.
The indigenous peoples of the United States (US), the American Indian tribes,
have legislative authority, executive departments, police, and prisons. In fact, they
resemble sub-State units of government, and exercise extensive governmental authority.
This governmental status raises several questions about the potential for tribal entities to
violate individual rights. Can the tribes exercise their governmental powers in a manner
which violates an individual’s human rights? Has the US implemented human rights
protections against the tribes? Can tribal conduct constitute a breach of international
human rights obligations binding on the US and, if so, what are the consequences? Is
tribal conduct attributable to the US under international law? This essay explores these

1

eg Mary and Carrie Dann (US) (Merits) IACHR Case 11.140 (2002) Report no 75/02 [96]-[98];
Lovelace v Canada HRC Communication no R 6/24 UN Doc Supp 40 (A/36/40) 166 (1981); Kitok v
Sweden (Merits) HRC UN Doc CCPR/C/33/D/197/85 [9.8].
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issues and endeavours to answer the question whether the US may incur international
responsibility for human rights violations committed by American Indian tribes.

B STATUS OF AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBES IN MUNICIPAL LAW

American Indian tribes, as acknowledged in the US Constitution of 1789, are distinct
political communities possessing attributes of self-government and legal systems
separate from the national (‘federal’) or state governments.2 The term ‘government’ in
this study does not refer only to an executive. Rather it is used to connote the entire
body of political institutions available to a political community, whether the US, its
states, or the Indian tribes. Thus, ‘tribal government’ refers to the tribal legislative,
executive, administrative, and judicial bodies established under the particular tribal
constitution. Tribal governments vary in size and complexity, and assert authority over
a wide range of people and territory. Certain California rancherias comprise only a few
families and acres of land, while a large tribe, such as the Navajo Nation operates as a
complex political community whose population approximates Iceland’s and whose
territorial extent rivals that of the Republic of Ireland.
Citizens of tribes are ‘members’, and most tribes have exclusive authority to
define their membership or ‘enrolment’. Membership in a tribal polity is a political, not
a racial or ethnic, classification.

Although the tribes comprise mainly indigenous

individuals descended from pre-Columbian inhabitants of North America, tribes are not
2

F Cohen Handbook of Federal Indian Law (Michie Charlottesville 1988) 232-34; Worcester v Georgia
31 US (6 Pet) 515, 8 L Ed 483 (1832) 559, 500.
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necessarily ethnically homogenous. They have been voluntarily and forcibly integrated
with others, and several tribes historically naturalized non-indigenous peoples, such as
escaped or freed African slaves. In addition to tribal membership, American Indians
born in US territory hold both US citizenship and citizenship of the US state in which
they reside.3 Certain tribes whose territory has been severed by the US-Mexican or USCanadian national borders enrol members from the non-US side of the boundary
making it possible for tribal members to be foreign nationals.
US municipal law conceptualises tribal governments as one of three ‘sovereign’
institutions, the others being the federal and state governments. The federal constitution
split the atom of sovereignty between state and national governments, but its
demarcation of governmental powers and individual rights does not bind the tribes,
which municipal law regards as pre-existing entities outside the federal framework.4 In
some respects municipal law categorizes tribes as entities analogous to foreign States
rather than as regional sub-State entities. Notably, until 1871 the federal government
dealt with the tribes through treaties which US courts continue to classify as equivalent
to international treaties in municipal law.5
Each tribe’s governmental powers vary depending on its unique treaty history
and applicable acts of Congress. To encompass this diversity, this paper generalizes

3

(2000) 8 USC s 1401(b) (naturalizes Indians born in US territory); US Const amd XIV (1868) (US state
citizenship derivative of national citizenship).

4

Talton v Mayes 163 US 376, 16 S Ct 986 (1896) 382-84, 988-90; US v Wheeler 435 US 313, 98 S Ct
1079 (1978).
5

Cheung v US 213 F 3d 82, 89-90 (9th Cir 2000).
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tribal authority.6 However, two types of American Indian tribes must be distinguished:
those recognized by the federal government and those without such recognition.
Federal recognition weaves tribes into the fabric of US constitutional law. Broadly
speaking, recognized tribes enjoy the powers and immunities of a sovereign government
under municipal law. Unrecognized tribes may possess treaty rights (such as hunting or
fishing rights) against the US, but municipal law regards them as private collective
associations or clubs rather than as governments with legislative or enforcement
jurisdiction.
In the US Supreme Court’s (USSC) foundational Indian-law trilogy,7 Chief Justice
Marshall articulated a view of tribes as distinct independent political communities with
exclusive authority in their territories derived from their original ‘tribal sovereignty’.
Nonetheless, the Court found that the tribes’ comparative weakness and dependence
upon the US required divestiture of external sovereignty: specifically the tribes’ rights
to treat with foreign States and to cede lands to any entity other than the federal
government. Though the Court disagreed with tribal claims to full independence, the
tribes retained internal aspects of sovereignty to govern themselves and others within
their territory. Still today municipal law characterizes tribal powers as derivative of
their status as ‘sovereign’ entities predating formation of the republic. Their legislative

6

Alaskan and Hawaiian Natives fall outside this description as do tribes whose adjudicative jurisdiction
has been compromised by Public Law 280, which extends state jurisdiction to tribal matters.

7

Johnson v McIntosh 21 US (8 Wheat) 543, 5 L Ed 681 (1823) (doctrine of discovery gives ‘discovering’
European State the sole right to acquire tribal territory through ‘purchase or conquest’); Cherokee Nation
v Georgia 30 US (5 Pet) 1, 8 L Ed 25 (1831) (treaties demonstrate tribe is a ‘state’, a ‘distinct political
society separated from others capable of managing its own affairs and governing itself’, but not a foreign
state); Worcester (n 2) (US is tribal ‘protector’ in an unequal alliance; the tribes retain all internal
attributes of sovereignty).
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and enforcement jurisdiction is inherent; it does not depend upon federal delegation,
though the federal government may delegate additional authority to the tribes.8
Following the judicial deprivation of external sovereignty, Congress and the
Courts have steadily eroded tribal powers so that tribes now enjoy a significantly
smaller sphere of legislative and enforcement jurisdiction than they did in the 1830s.
The federal common law doctrine of Congressional ‘plenary power’ over tribes9 permits
Congress to eliminate or reduce tribal powers. The doctrine extends to the point of
termination of the US-tribal relationship (changing a tribe’s status from recognized to
unrecognized), although certain tribal powers or immunities may survive this
termination. Federal courts also assert authority to divest tribal powers pursuant to a
common-law doctrine that the tribes occupy a dependent position in the hierarchy of
American ‘sovereigns’: federal courts may thus refuse to recognize tribal powers
inconsistent with their status as dependents of the federal government.10
Because federal common law conceptualises tribes as a sort of sovereign, its
‘sovereign immunity’ doctrine extends to them. This immunity shields the tribe, tribal
agencies, and tribal officials acting in an official capacity, against lawsuits challenging
governmental or commercial acts in federal, state, or tribal courts. It is the same
doctrine that shields foreign States, the federal government, and US state governments
from suit. However, in practice tribal immunity is more extensive than that accorded to
other governments, because statutory and judicial limitations restricting immunity do
8

US v Lara 541 US 193, 124 S Ct 1628 (2004).

9

Talton (n 4) 384.

10

Merrion v Jicarilla Apache Tribe 455 US 130, 102 S Ct 894 (1982) 149, 908.
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For instance, although the federal and state

governments statutorily waive immunity against tort claims, enabling individuals
injured by governmental officials to seek compensation, many tribes have not done so.11
Tribes retain legislative and enforcement jurisdiction over their internal affairs.
This jurisdiction includes the power to define their polity, to exclude individuals from
their lands, to make and enforce criminal and civil laws, to levy taxes, to regulate
marriage, and to decide whether to develop natural resources within their territories.
Tribal law enforcement officers have authority to stop and investigate non-Indians on
tribal lands for violations of state or federal law, and may detain and transport alleged
offenders to the authorities with adjudicative jurisdiction.12 More fundamentally, the
tribes organize their own governmental and political institutions. Most model their
governments on the US and create formal branches with partial separation of powers.
Others have retained traditional forms of government and customary legal systems.
Pueblos in Arizona and New Mexico, for example, retain traditional governments based
on unwritten customary law, without a formal court structure, while the Navajo Nation
operates a complex appellate court system, and has an exhaustive tribal code, but no
written constitution.
Whether a tribal court possesses adjudicative jurisdiction over a matter often
depends upon the nature of the claim, the identity of the claimant or defendant, and
where the claim arose. Jurisdiction might lie exclusively in tribal court, might be shared
11

Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v Manufacturing Technologies, Inc 523 US 751, 118 S Ct 1700 (1998); Sac
and Fox Nation v Hanson 47 F 3d 1061 (10th Cir 1995) 1064-65 cert denied 516 US 810 (1995); US
Commission on Civil Rights The Indian Civil Rights Act: A Report of the US Commission on Civil Rights
(US Washington DC 1991) 63-67.
12

Duro v Reina 495 US 676, 110 S Ct 2053 (1991) 697, 2056-57.
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with a federal court, or might lie exclusively in a federal court. Where concurrent
jurisdiction exists claimants must exhaust tribal remedies before pursuing a claim in the
federal system. Tribal courts retain inherent criminal jurisdiction over Indians, but their
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians has been judicially abrogated13 (though at least
one tribal court has found this decision did not affect its inherent criminal jurisdiction
over foreign nationals).14

C TRIBAL VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
OBLIGATIONS BINDING ON THE UNITED STATES
1

International Human Rights Obligations

Several human rights instruments bind the US under international law.

Those

susceptible to tribal violations include the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR),15 the International Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (ICAT),16 and the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD).17

Inter-American

jurisprudence demonstrates that the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of

13

Oliphant v Suquamish Indian Tribe 435 US 191, 98 S Ct 1011 (1978).

14

Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v Chavez (E Cherokee Ct 2004) Docket no CR-03-1039.

15

(adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 99 UNTS 171.

16

(adopted 10 December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987) 1465 UNTS 85.

17

(adopted 21 December 1965, entered into force 4 January 1969) 660 UNTS 195.
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Man (American Declaration)18 binds the US.19 Potential also exists for tribal law
enforcement officials to breach article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations (VCCR).20 The US must adopt such laws or other measures as may be
required to give effect to the substantive rights recognized in these documents.

2

US Implementation of its Human Rights Obligations

When the Senate ratifies an international human rights convention, it typically enters
reservations, declarations, and understandings, which attempt to restrict US
international obligations to the extent they differ from US municipal law. Thus, US law
automatically reflects its international undertakings and no statutory implementation is
necessary. The ICCPR, CERD, and ICAT bind the US internationally, but domestically
the self-execution doctrine prevents judicial enforcement of the treaty provisions.21 If
the Senate declares a treaty non-self-executing, as it has done for each of the human
rights conventions, the treaty provisions create no private cause of action and can only

18

OAS GA Res XXX (adopted by the 9th International Conference of the American States) (1948)
reprinted in ‘Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System’
OEA/Ser/L/V/II.82 Doc 6 Rev 1 (1992) 17.

19

Baby Boy Case (US) IACHR Case 2141 Resolution no 23/81 (1981) [13]-[17]; Roach and Pinkerton
(US) Case 9647 Report no 3/87 (1987) [46]-[49]; Interpretation of the American Declaration within the
Framework of the ACHR (Advisory Opinion OC-10/89) IACtHR Series A no 10 (1989) [35]-[45] (‘the
American Declaration is for [OAS member States] a source of international obligations related to the
Charter…’); Haitian Interdiction (US) (Merits) Case 10.675 Report no 51/96 (1997) n 35.

20

(adopted 24 April 1963, entered into force 19 March 1967) 596 UNTS 261.

21

US v Postal 589 F2d 862, 875-77 (5th Cir 1972) cert denied 444 US 832 (1979).
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9

The US believes its

commitment to comply with these conventions requires no implementing legislation
because pre-existing federal, state, and local laws provide sufficient protection to
individuals. A legal advisor to the State Department testified before a Senate hearing
on whether to ratify CERD, that:
As was the case with the earlier [human rights] treaties, existing US law
provides extensive protection and remedies.… There is thus no need for the
establishment of additional causes of action to enforce the requirements of the
convention.23
While this may be true in respect of federal and state governments, it is not true in
respect of tribal governments.
Most individual rights provisions which bind the US find expression in the US
Bill of Rights—the first ten amendments to the Constitution—and the 14th Amendment.
These protections bind federal and state governments,24 and are enforceable by
individuals in federal and state courts.

Judicial decisions and federal civil rights

legislation have created remedies for their violation by government officers. Yet, the
constitutional amendments and enforcement mechanisms are inapplicable to tribal
governments, rendering municipal law not fully reflective of US international human

22

D Weissbrodt J Fitzpatrick and F Newman International Human Rights: Law, Policy, and Progress (3rd
edn Anderson Cincinnati 2001) 687-89; Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law of the US (1987) s
131 comment h [58].
23

Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Conrad Harper, Legal Advisor to the State
Department (11 May 1994) 5 Dispatch Magazine 22; Weissbrodt (n 28) 689.
24

The due process clause of the 14th Amendment to the US Constitution incorporates most Bill of Rights
provisions against the states. The due process clause of the 5th Amendment incorporates the equal
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rights obligations. This implementation failure creates substantive gaps in the map of
US human rights law.
Congress’s one attempt to implement human rights protections against the
tribes, the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA),25 contains provisions analogous to
those found in the US Bill of Rights, and provides the only protection (apart from tribal
law) for Indians and non-Indians alike against tribal human rights violations. Though it
became law before US accession to any human rights conventions, ICRA reflects
several convention provisions. But it does not reflect them all, and this is important.
A juxtaposition of ICRA and the international human rights conventions reveals
substantive discrepancies. For example, article 14 of the ICCPR requires that indigent
criminal defendants be provided legal assistance ‘in any case where the interests of
justice so require’.26 The HRC has held that States must provide legal assistance at all
stages of criminal proceedings.27 The US achieves implementation of this provision
through the Constitution’s due process clauses, which require the states and federal
government to provide defence counsel to indigent criminal defendants facing
confinement,28 and declares its municipal law sufficient implementation of the ICCPR.
[T]he United States understands that [article 14(3)] do[es] not require the
provision of a criminal defendant's counsel of choice when the defendant is
provided with court-appointed counsel on grounds of indigence, when the

25

(2000) 25 USC ss 1301-1341.

26

ICCPR (n 15) art 14(3)(d).

27

Borisenko v Hungary HRC UN Doc CCPR/C/76/D/852/1999 (2002) [7.5].

28

Argersinger v Hamelin 407 US 25, 92 S Ct 2006 (1972); Tom v Sutton 533 F 2d 1101 (9th Cir 1976).
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defendant is financially able to retain alternative counsel, or when imprisonment
is not imposed.29
ICRA, however, fails to achieve implementation against tribal governments, because it
does not require them to provide legal assistance under any circumstances; tribes can
prosecute and sentence destitute defendants to one year’s imprisonment and a $5,000
fine without providing legal assistance of any kind.30 The tribes may choose to provide
legal assistance, but federal law does not so require. Other substantive gaps between
ICRA and US international obligations include the absence of a right to vote, a right to
participate in government, a right to review by a higher tribunal, and a right to privacy.
Domestic acceptance of tribal-federal criminal prosecutions may be another gap
in implementation.

The USSC case US v Lara illustrates how dual tribal-federal

prosecutions come about. In Lara, a non-member Indian assaulted a federal officer
during an arrest for violation of a tribal exclusion order.31 The defendant pleaded guilty
to the tribal crime of ‘violence against a policeman’ and served ninety days in prison.
The federal government subsequently prosecuted him for assaulting a federal official.
Because key elements of the tribal and federal crimes were identical the second
prosecution would normally be quashed.

However, the Court found the offences

distinct crimes against separate ‘sovereigns’ and upheld the federal conviction. Article
14(7) ICCPR provides that ‘[n]o one shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an
29

US ‘Reservations, declarations and understandings, ICCPR’ 138 Cong Rec S4781-01 (daily edn 2 April
1992) understanding 4. The HRC also views failure to provide competent counsel to indigent criminal
defendants violative of the provision. HRC ‘Concluding Observations: US’ (1995) UN Doc
CCPR/C/79/Add.50 [288].

30

ICRA (n 25) s 1302(7). Should a tribe exceed these penalties, the defendant may challenge its
jurisdiction in federal court.

31

Lara (n 8).
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offence for which he has already been finally convicted or acquitted…’. Municipal law
treats parallel prosecutions by the state, tribal, and federal governments as offences
against separate ‘sovereigns’ not barred by the US Constitution’s double jeopardy
clause. The US reservation to article 14(7) restricts its application to existing municipal
law as to the federal government and its ‘constituent units’. Since the tribes are not
constituent units of the federal system, dual tribal-federal prosecutions for the same
offence breach criminal defendants’ article 14(7) rights.
Even when an ICRA provision reproduces verbatim a constitutional right, which
reflects an international human right provision, tribal interests can justify conflicting
treatment of ICRA provisions and their constitutional predecessors.32 Courts have
‘correctly sensed that Congress did not intend … [constitutional principles to] disrupt
settled tribal customs’.33 Essentially, although ICRA protections implement against
tribes constitutional substantive rights, the precise meaning of these guarantees will be
different for tribal governments than for governments bound by the substantive
constitutional provisions. ICRA provisions may thereby develop meanings unreflective
of US international human rights obligations even where the ICRA provisions
superficially correspond to US constitutional rights implementing such obligations
against state and federal governments.
Municipal practice might fail sufficiently to reflect US international obligations
even where a treaty is self-executing. For instance, the US consistently fails to enforce

32

Wounded Head v Tribal Council of Oglala Sioux Tribe 507 F 2d 1079 (8th Cir 1975) 1082-83; Randall
v Yakima Nation Tribal Court 841 F 2d 897 (9th Cir 1988) 900.
33

Cohen (n 2) 670.
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its consular relations obligations against US states, and consequently has been haled
before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) several times for state violations of article
36 VCCR, which requires that arrested foreign nationals be notified of their right to
communicate with their consulate and that the consulate be notified upon detainment of
a national. Whilst federalism concerns have prevented domestic enforcement of the
VCCR against US states, potential tribal violations remain unexamined.
This point is contentious because federal Indian law scholars assert that the
USSC eliminated tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians in Oliphant v Suquamish
Indian Tribe.34 This appears to prevent tribes from breaching article 36 VCCR.35 Yet,
there are four areas in which tribes have authority to assert law enforcement jurisdiction
over foreign nationals. First, the membership of some border tribes includes Mexican
or Canadian foreign nationals.36 US municipal law identifies members of recognized
tribes as Indians and thus subjects these foreign nationals to tribal criminal jurisdiction.
Secondly, though the Court in Oliphant spoke of ‘non-Indians’ its reasoning applies
only to US citizen non-Indians. The tribal court in Eastern Cherokee Band of Indians v
Chavez exposed this flaw, and found that it retains inherent criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indian aliens.37 Thirdly, tribal power to exclude individuals from tribal lands

34

Oliphant (n 13) (non-Indians should not be subject to alien courts’ criminal jurisdiction).

35

J Kalt and J Singer ‘Myths and Realities of Tribal Sovereignty: The Law and Economics of Indian SelfRule’ (2004) Harvard Faculty Research Working Paper no RWP04-016 30 (‘tribes have no criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians whatsoever’).

36

Approximately 8,400 Tohono O’odham members are Mexican nationals. C Duarte ‘Tohono O’odham:
Campaign for Citizenship, Nation Divided’ (31 May 2001) Arizona Daily Star.

37

Chavez (n 14).
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Finally, tribal courts potentially retain

criminal contempt power over non-Indians.39 These points illustrate the potential for
tribal breaches of US consular relations obligations. Congressional plenary power over
the tribes frees the US from the federalism concerns evident in LaGrand,40 and permits
Congress to implement VCCR provisions against them.

3

Tribal Human Rights Violations

The USSC case, Santa Clara Pueblo v Martinez,41 provides a clear illustration of tribal
governments’ capacity to breach international human rights obligations of the US.
Despite arising prior to US accession to the international human rights covenants, a
similar case could arise today. In fact, the tribal law which gave rise to the litigation is
still in force.42 The factually analogous Human Rights Committee (HRC) decision,
Lovelace v Canada,43 can be used to test the assertion that the law at issue in Martinez,
or similar tribal laws, breach ICCPR provisions.
The facts giving rise to the Martinez case were as follows. Julia Martinez, a
full-blood member of the Santa Clara Pueblo, married a full-blood member of the

38

Linneen v Gila River Indian Community, 276 F3d 489 (9th Cir 2002) cert denied (2002) 536 US 939.

39

W Canby American Indian Law in a Nutshell (4th edn West St Paul 2004 ) 177.

40

LaGrand Case (Germany v US) (Merits) [2001] ICJ Rep 466.

41

436 US 49, 98 S Ct 1670 (1978).

42

B Berger ‘Indian Policy and the Imagined Indian Woman’ (2004) 14 KJLPP 103.

43

Lovelace (n 1).

International Responsibility for Human Rights Violations by American Indian Tribes

15

Navajo Nation in 1941. The couple had children and raised them on the Pueblo as tribal
members. The children were included in the cultural and spiritual life of the tribe and
spoke the Santa Claran language, Tewa, fluently.

Despite their clear genetic and

cultural affinity with the Pueblo, the Pueblo government denied the children tribal
membership on the basis of a tribal law which forbade children of Santa Claran mothers
and non-Santa Claran fathers to gain membership.

The law conversely permitted

children of Santa Claran fathers and non-Santa Claran mothers to become tribal
members.
Because their father was a non-member, the Martinez children could not acquire
citizenship in the political community with which they most closely identified. The
Pueblo asserted that the law represented its patriarchal cultural heritage, and did not
contest its discriminatory nature. A similar federal or state law would be struck down
as a violation of equal protection,44 but since the tribes are not constituent entities of the
federation tribal laws cannot violate such constitutional protections.

The Pueblo

membership law discriminates on the basis of gender and violates several international
human rights provisions which bind the US. It therefore breaches US international
obligations, and, if attributable to the US, entails US international responsibility.
The discriminatory Pueblo statute violates the non-discrimination, equal
protection, and effective remedy provisions of the ICCPR and American Declaration.
The tribal gender discrimination gives rise to additional violations of individual rights
guaranteed by the ICCPR, most prominently the denial to her children of the individual

44

Caban v Mohammed, 441 US 380, 99 S Ct 1760 (1979) (invalidating a state law which discriminated
between parental rights based on gender of the parent).
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right to partake in minority culture (article 27) and the right to take part in government
(article 25). The Martinez children lost all benefits of tribal membership and faced
several hardships. When their mother died, they could not inherit her property, use
tribal property, or remain on tribal lands. As non-members they were ineligible to
participate in tribal government and could be excluded from access to their culture,
language, and religion. Martinez sued the Pueblo and Pueblo Governor in federal court
to overturn the discriminatory statute as a violation of the ICRA equal protection
clause.45 The USSC found that ICRA did not abrogate tribal immunity and created no
federal cause of action.

Although the Court explained that the tribal court is the

appropriate forum, a tribal court will not entertain a suit against the tribe, or a tribal
official, unless tribal sovereign immunity has been waived, whether by common law or
by statute. ICRA thus becomes an illusory implementation of US international human
rights obligations.46
Lovelace v Canada,47 involved a law very similar to the Pueblo law at issue in
Martinez and demonstrates that the tribal law violates the human rights of Santa Clara
women and children. Lovelace, a Maliseet Indian in Canada, lost her tribal membership
upon her 1970 marriage to a non-Indian. The Indian Act, a Canadian federal law,
terminated the tribal membership of Indian women who marry non-Indians, but
permitted male Indians who intermarry to retain membership. It also made Lovelace’s

45

Martinez (n 41) 54-55; 1675.

46

Dubray v Rosebud Housing Authority 12 ILR 6015 (Rosebud Sioux Tribal Ct 1985) (federal court had
dismissed claim on basis that tribal court was appropriate forum; tribal court dismissed finding no waiver
of tribal immunity).
47

Lovelace (n 1).
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children ineligible for membership. The HRC recognized that the Indian Act ‘entails
serious disadvantages on the part of the Indian woman who wants to marry a non-Indian
man’.48 These disadvantages were similar to those found in Martinez, and included loss
of the right to reside or possess lands within the reserve, to inherit possessory interests
in reserve land, or to be buried on tribal land. Loss of status also resulted in a loss of
the right to exercise Indian hunting and fishing rights, and to partake in tribal culture
and religion. The intertemporal principle prevented the HRC from finding Canada
responsible for a breach of the ICCPR non-discrimination provisions, because the
Convention did not enter into force against Canada until six years after the marriage.49
However, it found Lovelace’s continuing loss of cultural benefits breached article 27’s
right of minorities to participate in culture, language, and religion in community with
other group members. Canada has since revised the Indian Act to eliminate gender
discrimination and to permit children of women who intermarry to retain tribal
membership, but the HRC has expressed concern over continuing exclusion of
subsequent generations.50
Whereas Canada enacted the discriminatory Act at issue in Lovelace, the
analogous law at issue in Martinez was a tribal ordinance. Each law deprived minority
individuals their right to partake in culture and religion. They also had significant
effects on property rights and rights of participation in the tribal political community.
Lovelace substantiates the contention that the Pueblo ordinance violates ICCPR
48

ibid [7.2].

49

ibid [10]-[12].

50

HRC ‘Concluding Observations: Canada’ (1999) UN Doc CCPR/C/79/Add.105.
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provisions which bind the US under international law. The HRC statement that the
right of access to minority culture protects those ‘brought up on a reserve, who have
kept ties with their community and wish to maintain those ties’ would surely encompass
the Martinez children.

These cases demonstrate that the American Indian tribes,

through exercise of their governmental powers, are capable of conduct violative of US
international human rights obligations.
A fascinating possibility exists that the traditional tribal punishment of
banishment breaches international human rights norms binding on the US, such as
ICCPR’s article 27 individual rights of access to minority culture or even CERD’s
provisions on participation in government. Banishment involves expulsion of a member
and deprivation of his or her rights to vote, to participate in tribal government, to take
part in the tribe’s religious and cultural life, to inherent property, and to use tribal lands.
Banished members have alleged that their tribe imposed the punishment for improper
reasons, such as their race or political views.51 In Poodry v Tonawanda Band of Seneca
Indians,52 claimants alleged that the tribe convicted them in absentia for treason
(conspiracy to overthrow the tribal government) and banished them. Although the
Poodry court indicated in obiter dicta that ICRA implicitly proscribes banishment, no
other cases support this view.

The HRC has defined minority membership as

‘objective’, and it has been suggested that article 27 not only prevents States from

51

Seminole Nation of Oklahoma v Norton 223 F Supp 2d 122 (DC Dist 2002).

52

Poodry v Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians 85 F 3d 874 (2nd Cir 1996) 884, 898.
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defining minority group membership, but also prevents minority groups from
conclusively defining their own membership.53
Limited federal review of ICRA violations and tribal sovereign immunity
prevent abundant litigation of tribal human rights violations.

Nonetheless, several

examples of tribal conduct in breach of US international obligations can be gleaned
from federal and tribal case reports. Tribes have prevented members of African descent
from voting or participating in government based on their race in violation of CERD’s
prohibition on racial discrimination in the context of civil and political rights.54
Traditional Pueblos have attempted to limit members’ religious freedom.55 Claimants
have alleged free speech violations, arbitrary detention and seizure of property, and
conduct arguably within the definition of cruel or degrading treatment.56 Conditions in
tribal prisons are routinely cited as among the worst in the US.57

The HRC has

commented on conditions in US prisons but has not specifically considered tribal

53

S Joseph, J Schultz and M Castan International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases,
Materials, and Commentary (2d ed OUP Oxford 2004) [24.10]-[24.11]; HRC ‘General Comment 23: The
Rights of Minorities (Article 27)’ UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev1/Add5 (1994) [5.2]; Lovelace (n 49); Kitok
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rights, to an individual already permitted to herd did not constitute an article 27 ICCPR breach).
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Nero v Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma 892 F 2d 1457, 1463 (10th Cir 1989); Norton (n 50); Davis v US
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detention facilities.58 The tribes are in a special position to breach certain civil and
political rights of their members, but official actions like arbitrary detention or wrongful
seizure of property can be perpetrated against Indians, non-Indians, and foreign
nationals alike. These cases illustrate the lacuna between US international human rights
obligations and municipal implementation against tribal governments.

D DOMESTIC REMEDIES FOR TRIBAL VIOLATIONS
1

Access to Courts

Whereas the few substantive gaps in implementation of international obligations against
the tribes may seem trivial, Martinez gave rise to a deeper flaw in implementation. The
Court found that ICRA, the only federal legislation which obligates tribes to protect
individual human rights and fragmentarily reflects US international human rights
obligations, permits no federal judicial review of tribal violations other than habeas
corpus review for ongoing wrongful detention.59 An allegation of a tribal human rights
violation must be resolved in tribal court, though ICRA does not require the creation of
a formal court structure and tribal courts may find ICRA claims barred by the tribal
sovereign immunity doctrine.60 Under federal law, tribal courts are technically bound to
enforce ICRA’s provisions, but, since federal courts cannot review tribal court
58

Concluding Observations (n 29) [285] (HRC expressed concern ‘about conditions of detention of
persons deprived of liberty in federal or state prisons’); HRC General Comment 21 clarifies that States
bear responsibility for all prisons within their territory. UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7 (1992) 153.

59
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decisions, no guarantee exists that the tribe will enforce ICRA, or by extension, US
international human rights obligations. This is the procedural gap in implementation:
individuals have no domestic forum capable of enforcing certain human rights
provisions guaranteed in the UN Conventions and American Declaration against the
tribes.
The Martinez Court also held that ICRA creates no private cause of action in
federal courts for equitable (declaratory or injunctive) relief against tribal officials and
refused to imply Congressional intent to create such an action. It reasoned that to do so
would undermine the authority of tribal courts and would be contrary to the
Congressional intention to protect tribal self-government. This decision stands in sharp
contrast to the Court’s jurisprudence interpreting civil rights legislation against the
states and federal government.61 In these contexts it regularly infers federal causes of
action to promote enforcement of civil rights. Yet in the tribal context, the tribes’ status
as separate political communities and the national policy of tribal independence
prevents implied causes of action. The Court explained its reluctance to imply federal
judicial review in this way:
[W]e have … recognized that the tribes remain quasi-sovereign nations which,
by government structure, culture, and source of sovereignty are in many ways
foreign to the constitutional institutions of the Federal and [s]tate governments.62
The Martinez judgment also shows that juridical treatment of tribal laws
inconsistent with international human rights obligations diverges from treatment of
similarly situated state laws. Where potential conflict arises between a state law and a
61

62

Martinez (n 41) 61; 1678-79.
ibid 71; 1683-84.
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treaty, US courts interpret the state law as consistent with US international obligations.
This mechanism prevents invocation of the constitution’s supremacy clause to declare
state law invalid.

Even non-self-executing treaties, such as the human rights

conventions, may supersede state law or policy.63 This mechanism fails in the tribal
context because federal courts lack jurisdiction to review tribal laws which may conflict
with US international human rights obligations.
The US Court of Appeals case of Linneen v Gila River Indian Community
exemplifies the lack of domestic tribunals with jurisdiction to adjudicate claims by
those asserting tenable allegations of tribal human rights violations. The non-Indian
claimants alleged violations amounting to arbitrary detention and degrading treatment.64
Although the non-Indian claimants in Linneen happen to have been US nationals,
foreign nationals could find themselves similarly mistreated by tribal law enforcement
officials exercising, for example, the tribal right of exclusion or investigation, which
could create an international dispute for reparations for injuries to aliens.

Claimants

asserted, inter alia, false imprisonment and unreasonable search and seizure claims
against the tribe and a tribal law enforcement officer. They sought compensation under
the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which provides compensation for violations of
constitutional rights caused by those acting under colour of law. Yet the Linneen court
dismissed the claims, because ICRA creates no federal cause of action and neither the
US Constitution nor the Civil Rights Act applies to tribes. Tribal sovereign immunity
shielded the officer himself from claims for damages, and prevented the claimants
63

Restatement (n 22) s 115 comment e.

64
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bringing an action against the tribe or tribal officer in tribal court. Clearly, the tribe’s
failure to waive immunity denied the claimants an effective remedy.
The expansive protection afforded tribal officials through the tribal sovereign
immunity doctrine raises questions of the efficacy of the rule of law in tribal legal
systems.65 The lacuna of coverage of international human rights law in this instance
goes unremarked by legal commentators. Professor Shelton, for example, asserts that
the USSC:
[H]as affirmed that the right of access to the courts ‘assures that no person will
be denied the opportunity to present to the judiciary allegations concerning
violations of fundamental constitutional rights’, such as those recognized in the
Civil Rights Act of 1871.66
This conclusion is incorrect in situations of tribal human rights violations. ICRA itself
purports to protect individual human rights against tribal governments, but creates
limited access to federal courts and questionable access to tribal courts.67

Tribal

sovereign immunity prevents such access, and consequently violates the US
international obligations to ensure the availability of effective remedies.68

2

Substantive Remedies

65

Commission Report (n 11) 65.

66

D Shelton Remedies in International Human Rights Law (OUP Oxford 2000) 66.

67

The only exception is habeas corpus review for wrongful detention following exhaustion of tribal
remedies.
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Questions about the lack of substantive domestic remedies have not been raised in
respect of federal and state governments because common law and statutory
mechanisms have been created to ensure that individuals alleging human rights
violations against these governments have access to tribunals with power to fashion
remedies. It is generally assumed that these mechanisms permit judicial enforcement of
human rights claims against all levels of government within the US, but this
characterization neglects tribes as governmental entities capable of violating individual
human rights.
In respect of substantive remedies, compensation is appropriate for arbitrary
deprivations of liberty such as that alleged in Linneen,69 where the factual situation
resembled arbitrary detention cases in the HRC, the IACHR, and various international
claims tribunals, which have found compensation to be the appropriate remedy.70 A US
ICCPR declaration states that it:
[U]nderstands the right to compensation … to require the provision of effective and
enforceable mechanisms by which a victim of an unlawful arrest or detention or a
miscarriage of justice may seek and, where justified, obtain compensation from
either the responsible individual or the appropriate governmental entity.71
Even the USSC has recognized that compensation ‘against the offending party is a vital
component of any scheme for vindicating cherished constitutional guarantees’.72 The
Court established the common law mechanism for provision of compensation where
69

Shelton (n 66) 118-20.

70

The HRC has found that where a State violates articles 9 or 14 ICCPR it must compensate the victim
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federal officials violate individual rights in Bivens v Six Unknown Federal Agents.73
Bivens actions do not extend to state or tribal officers, but Congress statutorily enabled
claims for compensation against state officials.74

Professor Shelton views this

legislation as an extension of the compensation remedy to ‘other levels of
government’.75

The legislation however does not extend to tribal officials.

US

municipal law permits no claims for compensation against tribal law enforcement
officers acting in an official capacity unless the tribe itself has abrogated tribal
sovereign immunity.76
Unlike compensatory relief, equitable (declaratory and injunctive) remedies are
generally available against governmental officials in the US to rectify ongoing or
imminent governmental violations of individual rights.77 Under US law tribal sovereign
immunity does not protect tribal officials from suit for equitable relief, but the USSC
refused to find an implied federal cause of action for equitable relief against the tribe or
tribal officers in ICRA.78
[U]nless and until Congress makes clear its intention to permit the additional
intrusion on tribal sovereignty that adjudication of such actions in a federal
forum would represent, we are constrained to find that [ICRA] does not
impliedly authorize actions for declaratory or injunctive relief against either the
tribe or its officers.79
73

403 US 388, 91 S Ct 1999 (1971)

74

Civil Rights Act of 1871 codified as amended at (2000) 42 USC s 1983.
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Where tribal law does not waive tribal sovereign immunity, tribal courts can refuse to
adjudicate claims for equitable relief.80

The US Commission on Civil Rights has

articulated concern that:
The barring of all suits against a tribal government without its consent,
particularly suits for injunctive or equitable relief under a statute such as the
ICRA providing rights against the tribal government, can leave the plaintiff with
a feeling of frustration, and often leaves the victim without an impartial tribal
forum in which to seek redress under the ICRA or the tribe’s own civil rights
law.81
Not only does the plaintiff feel frustrated, the tribes violate the US international
obligation to provide an effective remedy to those whose human rights they may have
violated.
Whilst federal remedies are generally unavailable, some tribes do enable their
courts to fashion effective remedies. In a claim brought by prisoners under ICRA’s
cruel and unusual punishment clause, for instance, the Colville tribal court found
official immunity for equitable relief waived and closed the tribal prison until
improvements were made.82 Had tribal prison conditions been severe enough and tribal
remedies unavailable, the prisoners may have successfully petitioned a federal court for
the writ of habeas corpus, the sole federal remedy available for tribal human rights
violations. Congress gave federal courts jurisdiction to issue this ‘great writ of liberty’

80

Dubray (n 46); Garman v Fort Belknap Community Council 11 ILR 6017 (Ft Belknap Tribal Ct 1984)
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It permits a federal judge to protect individuals against arbitrary or

wrongful confinement by an American Indian tribe.
A federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus against tribal detention requires:
exhaustion of tribal remedies; a severe restraint of individual liberty; and a violation of
ICRA’s substantive provisions.

Exhaustion of tribal remedies typically entails an

appeal to the tribe’s highest court.84 A severe restraint of liberty may include tribal
action beyond actual physical detention of the claimant: the Poodry case permitted
habeas review of a tribal decision to banish certain members for ‘treason’. Subsequent
cases, though, appear to have narrowed the scope of habeas review to situations where a
claimant is in physical custody or awaiting criminal trial before a tribal court.85
Because the federal court must identify a violation of a substantive provision of ICRA
before issuing a writ of habeas corpus,86 tribal violations of human rights omitted from
ICRA, such as the indigent defendant’s right to criminal defence counsel, are not
cognisable in federal court.87

The habeas corpus remedy thus confines federal court

review of tribal human rights violations to tribal court or tribal law enforcement actions
enumerated in ICRA and resulting in ongoing wrongful detention.

83
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Individuals alleging human rights violations have a right to an effective remedy
under international law binding on the US. 88 This right includes a procedural right of
access to a competent tribunal with power to fashion a remedy and a substantive right to
an effective remedy.89 Two problems arise with the domestic remedial regime: tribal
sovereign immunity often precludes access to any tribunal, whether federal, state, or
tribal; and where a tribal court has power to fashion a remedy, if it declines to do so or
its remedy proves ineffective, US federal courts lack jurisdiction to review the tribal
court decision.90 Municipal law leaves the provision of remedies to the tribes, yet it is
the United States which may bear international responsibility where tribes violate
individual rights and fail to provide effective remedies.

E ATTRIBUTION OF TRIBAL VIOLATIONS TO THE UNITED STATES
1

Tribes as State Organs

‘Every internationally wrongful act entails international responsibility’.91

The US

commits an internationally wrongful act, and its international responsibility is engaged,
if tribal violations of international human rights obligations are attributable to it. The
88
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preceding sections demonstrate that the tribes may commit acts or omissions violative
of the international human rights obligations of the US, the criterion for international
wrongfulness, but to determine whether a tribal violation incurs US international
responsibility requires an examination of the principles of attribution.92 The Iran-US
Claims Tribunal has stated that ‘in order to attribute an act to the State it is necessary to
identify with reasonable certainty the actors and their association with the State’.93
The International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Responsibility of States
for Internationally Wrongful Acts (Articles on State Responsibility) identifies several
principles of attribution that could be used to attribute tribal human rights violations to
the US. Article 4 reiterates the rule of customary international law that attributes to
States the conduct of government organs regardless of their position in the State
hierarchy or branch of government. Characterization of tribes as State organs provides
the most plausible method of attribution given the tribes’ municipal status as
governmental entities and the unity of the State in international law.94
That the tribes’ legal systems and political institutions exist largely outside the
US federal framework makes characterization of tribes as organs of the federal
government conceptually difficult from the standpoint of US municipal law. Tribes are
not federated entities as their exemption from constitutional human rights norms
illustrates.

US public law treats federally recognized tribes as separate political

communities with autonomous governments invested with inherent powers and

92

Articles (n 91) art 2 commentary [5]-[6].

93

Yeager v Islamic Republic of Iran 17 Iran-USCTR 92 (1987) 101-2.

94

Articles (n 91) art 4.

International Responsibility for Human Rights Violations by American Indian Tribes

30

immunities. Attribution of tribal human rights violations to the US, however, does not
depend on the domestic characterization of tribal powers: reference to municipal law for
the status of State organs is insufficient.95
The definition of a State organ is construed broadly in international law.
Conduct of an entity exercising public functions, such as a tribal law enforcement
agency, is normally attributed to the State even if municipal law regards the institution
as autonomous or independent of the government.96 The expansive definition of State
organs encompasses sub-State entities analogous to the tribes. For instance, the FrancoItalian Conciliation Commission in the Heirs of the Duc de Guise case attributed
conduct of the autonomous region of Sicily to Italy, because the Italian state was
responsible for implementation of its international obligations notwithstanding Sicily’s
status in municipal law.97 The commentary to article 4 notes that all governments
affirmed that ‘the State became responsible as a result of “[a]cts or omissions of bodies
exercising public functions of a legislative or executive character”’ in preparation for
the Conference on the Codification of International Law of 1930.98 It cites a long line
of cases, beginning with Montijo, which articulate the principle that it is irrelevant for
purposes of characterization of an entity as a State organ whether the entity in question
is a federated entity or a specific autonomous area.99
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For this reason it would be remarkable if an international tribunal considering
the question of attribution of a tribal human rights violation to the US were to find the
tribes not organs of the State. After all, the US states—which are federated entities
unlike tribes—function autonomously in their fields of exclusive competence. They
exercise inherent governmental powers, as do the tribes, and the ICJ has attributed state
conduct to the US when its federated entities exercise inherent powers, even where the
national government lacks authority to compel compliance with its international
obligations.100 Similarly, tribal conduct which breaches US international human rights
obligations is attributable to the US, because governmental organs of any type,
irrespective of their position within the State, are State organs for purposes of
attribution.101
An international tribunal should have no difficulty extending the general
principle that the State is responsible for the acts of autonomous regions to the tribes as
distinct governmental entities within the US. But could international law directly bind
the tribes? Professors Wouters and De Smet102 suggest the ICJ’s statement that ‘the
Governor of Arizona is under the obligation to act in conformity with the international
undertakings of the United States’103 means that international law obliges federated
entities to comply with the federation’s international obligations. They stretch the
99
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court’s language to conclude that ‘federated entities themselves could under certain
conditions be held to be directly internationally responsible for violations of
international law.’104 If correct, the tribes are bound to act in conformity with US
international human rights obligations, as a matter of international law. This is unlikely,
however, since neither the tribes nor the US states have international legal personality.
It is a general principle that the statutory implementation and structuring of international
human rights norms, and the specific protection of individuals against violations of
these substantive rights, are primarily domestic concerns.105 The ICJ’s failure to revisit
the responsibility of US states in Avena and Other Mexican Nationals106 indicates that
while the US may bear responsibility for tribal human rights violations, it must also
decide how best to prevent tribal and state violations.

2

Tribes as Entities Exercising Governmental Authority

The conduct of entities enabled by municipal law to perform public functions is also
attributable to the State.107 If the tribes were not characterized as State organs for
purposes of attribution, tribal human rights violations could still be attributed to the US
under the principle articulated in article 5 of the Articles on State Responsibility. This
principle permits attribution of the conduct of a person or entity which is not a State
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organ but which the law of the State empowers to exercise elements of governmental
authority, provided the person or entity acts in that capacity in that instance.108 The
commentary indicates that this rule of attribution has been applied mainly to para-statal
entities and privatised government service providers. The tribes’ authority to exercise a
wide range of public functions in US municipal law justifies treatment as para-statal
entities exercising governmental authority in place of federal or state organs.
This category is a narrow one, but likely encompasses attribution of tribal
human rights violations to the US. Unlike the preceding principle on the attribution of
the conduct of State organs, it requires analysis of municipal law. The conduct to be
attributed must be of a public nature and the entity must exercise such power under
municipal law. Although the source of tribal authority does not generally flow from the
basic US law, the constitution, federal common law and legislation have long
recognized tribes as entities empowered to assert governmental authority. Tribal public
functions include the provision of social services, law enforcement, prisons, and courts.
Tribes can also privatise their public functions. So, for example, the conduct of a
privatised tribal prison official is attributable to the US because the official exercises
governmental authority. This authority is tribal rather than state or federal, but is
attributable to the State because of its public nature.

3

108

Tribes as Private Entities

ibid.
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It appears the tribes, as governmental entities, satisfy the test for State organs under the
international law of State responsibility. Judge Canby, however, has proposed that
recent USSC jurisprudence may articulate a theory of tribal powers as nongovernmental.109 A line of cases implicitly characterizes tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers as though the jurisdiction derives from a status analogous to private
associations or private landowners.110

Private clubs can regulate membership and

landowners can establish rules for others on their land.

If accepted, this non-

governmental view of tribal powers could impact attribution, because international
tribunals may look to municipal law for guidance in determining whether an entity
operates as a private association or a State organ.111
Parallels can be drawn between tribal conduct and the conduct of cultural or
religious communities such as the Amish. The Amish govern themselves through
customary laws, live in isolated communities without modern conveniences, speak their
own language, and adhere to a strict religious creed. It is possible for the Amish to
breach members’ substantive rights under international law, such as the right to
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education,112 or the right of minorities to partake in the cultural, religious, and linguistic
life of the minority community.113
The Amish could not be classified as State organs or entities exercising
governmental authority because they have no public functions or authority. Their
conduct is not generally attributable to the US unless it has acknowledged or adopted
the conduct as its own.114 Unlike the Amish, the federally recognized tribes have
separate legal personality under municipal law as governmental organizations and
instrumentalities.

The US recognizes the tribes’ prescriptive and enforcement

jurisdiction over non-members for the purposes of civil adjudication and exclusion.
The governmental nature of the tribes can be distinguished from private groups, for
instance, in the case of trespass. If a non-member, or expelled member, trespasses on
Amish land state law enforcement officials remove the trespasser, and the Amish
landowner may sue the trespasser in state court under state law. However, if a nonmember trespasses on tribal land, tribal officials can remove the member, and the
landowner may sue the trespasser in tribal court under tribal law. The few decisions
indicating a judicial view of the tribes as private associations cannot overcome the
substantial precedent and current practice of the US treating tribes as governments. The
federal executive’s official policy requires treatment of tribes on a government-togovernment basis.115

Further, the USSC recently held that tribes retain inherent
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governmental powers over non-member Indian criminal defendants.116 It appears
unlikely that an international tribunal would view tribes as governmental entities when
exerting authority over Indians, but not when exerting authority over non-Indians. This
municipal recognition provides a basis for international treatment of tribes as State
organs.
The unrecognized tribes, like the Amish, cannot be classified as State organs.
Municipal law views them as non-governmental entities and they exercise no
prescriptive or enforcement jurisdiction.

Whilst these tribes may retain residual

governmental powers, they are generally characterized as private entities.

Of course,

traditional tribal governments may continue to operate, but without US recognition they
are no different than private associations. Although it is theoretically possible for an
unrecognized tribe to violate a member’s right to access to minority culture, or to deny
retained tribal treaty rights to individuals, these breaches are not generally attributable
to the US.
While purely private conduct cannot generally be attributed to a State,117 the US
may be held internationally responsible for private conduct in particular circumstances.
The human rights instruments require it to ensure the rights protected to all individuals
within its territory. It fails to meet this obligation if it allows private violations to occur
without impunity or fear of retribution. To ensure human rights protections States must
115
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exercise due diligence to prevent private conduct which breaches an individual’s human
rights and to investigate and punish such violations.118 A State’s omission, as a breach
of its human rights obligations, must remain analytically distinct from attribution of
private conduct, however.119 If State agents control, direct, or approve human rights
violations committed by private actors, or decide to allow such violations to continue,
the acts are attributable to the State.120 The commentary to Chapter II of the Articles on
State Responsibility notes that the different rules of attribution have a ‘cumulative
effect’ so that a State may be held internationally responsible for the effects of a private
entity’s conduct. If the US fails to take necessary measures to prevent such effects,121 it
faces the possibility of international responsibility for human rights violations by the
Amish, unrecognized tribes, or other private entities or actors. If it knew, for example,
that an unrecognized tribe had arbitrarily detained and mistreated an individual, but
permitted the detention to continue, the tribal conduct would then be attributed to it.122

4

Tribal Agents Exceeding Authority

A tribal agent may incur US international responsibility for conduct that violates an
individual’s human rights even if the agent acts outside his or her sphere of authority or
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violates tribal or federal law.123 In Linneen,124 the non-Indian claimants asserted that a
uniformed tribal law enforcement officer arbitrarily detained them for three to four
hours, pointed his gun at their heads, threatened to seize their property and kill their
animals, and told them immediately to accept Jesus Christ as their saviour, because he
was going to kill them and dispose their bodies in the wilderness. Such action by a
tribal official violates international prohibitions on arbitrary detention, and, possibly,
provisions on cruel or inhuman treatment. Tribal sovereign immunity shielded the
officer and tribe from suit in tribal and federal court because he was acting in his
official capacity at the time. Although such arbitrary detention and mistreatment goes
beyond the tribal officer’s legitimate powers, this does not affect attribution.125
The Caire claim demonstrates that such ultra vires actions by tribal public
officials are attributable to the US. In Caire, the tribunal held that the conduct of public
officers, even if they act outside their competence, involves the responsibility of the
State if the officials act under cover of their status and use means ‘placed at their
disposal on account of that status’.126 Whether a tribal official acts in his or her official
capacity depends on whether the officer was ‘cloaked with governmental authority’.127
Tribal police, wardens, and other tribal officials, operate as public officials within tribal
territory.

The rules of attribution make conduct of such governmental officials
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attributable to the State, even if such conduct exceeds the officials’ authority under
tribal or federal law.128

F POTENTIAL INTERNATIONAL REMEDIAL MECHANISMS

The US has not accepted the individual petition mechanisms which enable the UN
human rights monitoring bodies (the HRC, the Committee Against Torture (CAT), and
the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD)) to consider
individual complaints, to reach views on the merits, and to recommend remedies.129
Thus, an individual deprived of his or her due process rights or tortured by an American
Indian tribe could not bring a petition before the HRC or the CAT. However, it is
possible for the monitoring bodies to address alleged tribal violations of US human
rights obligations through the State reporting, inquiry, and inter-State complaint
procedures (though the inter-State complaint mechanisms have never been used).130
Until the US withdrawal from the VCCR Optional Protocol on compulsory jurisdiction
takes effect,131 the ICJ would also have jurisdiction over disputes if a tribal government

128
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were to violate a foreign national’s right to consular notification.132 Alternatively, if a
tribe interferes with the substantive rights of a foreign national, the injured state may
seek redress through international dispute resolution mechanisms and diplomatic
pressure.
The regional inter-American human rights regime allows injured individuals or
groups to petition the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR). This
mechanism extends to violations of the American Declaration, a source of international
obligations binding on all Organization of American States (OAS) member States, and
therefore permits petitions against the US, which is not a state party to the American
Convention on Human Rights (ACHR).

The US has objected to the American

Declaration’s binding character.133 Nevertheless, the IACHR has several times asserted
authority to declare the US in breach of its international obligations under the
Declaration and to make recommendations on remedial measures.134 The IACHR has
also declared the US responsible for violations of rules of customary international law
and jus cogens norms relative to human rights.135 If the US fails to comply with
IACHR recommendations, the Commission may ratify and publicize its report and
submit it to the OAS General Assembly. It continues evaluating measures adopted in
respect of its recommendations until compliance is achieved.136
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Exactly which rights individuals possess under this regional system is a matter
of some controversy. The revised OAS Charter refers to ‘fundamental rights’ eight
times, but does not define the phrase.137 The IACHR has interpreted it to mean the
American Declaration principles read ‘in light of’ current international law,138 which
extends its reach beyond the Declaration principles themselves.

This method has

implications for the study of potential tribal violations because it allows the IACHR to
declare responsibility for international obligations beyond those espoused in the
Declaration. For instance, the IACHR has interpreted the Declaration in light of article
27 ICCPR on individual rights to partake in minority culture, which the tribes are in a
unique legal position to violate through tribal laws defining membership and the quasicriminal punishment of tribal banishment.

The IACHR has relied on this ICCPR

provision to ground violations of American Declaration protections including the right
to life, liberty, and personal security (article I); the right to residence and movement
(article VIII); and the right to the preservation of health and to well being (article XI).139
The IACHR has also based violations of the Declaration’s right to a fair trial and due

136

IACHR ‘Rules of Procedure’ (approved by the IACHR at its 109th special session 4-8 December 2000)
in ‘Annual Report 2000’ OEA/Ser./L/V/II.111 (16 April 2001) (amended at 116th regular sessions 7-25
October 2002 and 118th regular sessions 7-24 October 2003) arts 45, 46.
137

(adopted 2 May 1948, entered into force 13 December1951) 119 UNTS 3 (as amended by the Protocol
of Buenos Aires (1970), the Protocol of Cartagena (1988), the Protocol of Washington (1997), and the
Protocol of Managua (1996)); (OAS Charter) preamble, arts 3(k), 16, 44, 48, 52, 111 and 150.

138

IACHR takes into account ‘the corpus juris gentium of international human rights law’ when
interpreting the American Declaration. Dann (n 1) [96]-[98].

139

Yanomami (Brazil) IACHR Case 7615 Resolution no 12/85 (1985); IACHR ‘Report on the Situation
on the Human Rights of a Segment of the Nicaraguan Population of Miskito Origin (Nicaragua)’
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.62 Doc 10 Rev 3 (1983). It has also interpreted the ACHR in light of article 27 ICCPR.
IACHR ‘Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Ecuador’ OEA/Ser.L/V/II.96 Doc 10 Rev 1 (1997).

International Responsibility for Human Rights Violations by American Indian Tribes

42

process of law provisions (articles XVIII and XXVI) on US obligations to foreign
nationals and their states under the VCCR.140
The IACHR’s individual petition mechanism provides one avenue for those
alleging human rights violations by the US to pursue a claim before an international
tribunal. The exhaustion of domestic remedies rule applies to IACHR petitions, but
tribal sovereign immunity may prevent any tribal or federal remedy. Tribal courts may
or may not have jurisdiction over the claim depending on whether the particular tribe
limits immunity from human rights claims. Of course, even if the tribal court fashions a
remedy it may prove ineffective, and permit a challenge at the inter-American level.
Tribal sovereign immunity prevents an appeal to federal court, except in cases of
ongoing physical custody. This situation permits an injured individual in most human
rights cases to overcome the exhaustion of domestic remedies hurdle by exhausting
whatever tribal remedies are made available. Appeals to federal courts should not be
required as they generally lack jurisdiction to review human rights claims against the
tribes.
In the recent Dann case the Commission found the US responsible for violations
of international law related to its wrongful taking of Western Shoshone tribal lands. In
particular it concluded that the US failed to ensure the Danns’ American Declaration
rights to a fair trial, to property, and to equality before the law. The Commission
recommended that the US provide the petitioners with an effective remedy, including
adoption of legislative or other measures to ensure respect for their right to property. It
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further recommended that the US ensure the property rights of indigenous persons are
determined in accordance with the rights established in the American Declaration.141
The case marked the first instance of an international human rights body finding the US
responsible for violating human rights specific to an indigenous people. Tribes have
heralded Dann as a model for future complaints against the US to promote tribal
interests. What they may not yet recognize is that the IACHR individual petition
mechanism also permits the Commission to consider claims against the US for human
rights violations by the tribes themselves.
A case such as Linneen, where a tribal official allegedly arbitrarily detained and
mistreated individuals provides an ideal candidate. If it, or a similar case, comes before
the IACHR and a tribe has in fact violated individual human rights binding on the US,
the Commission can attribute such conduct to the US and declare it responsible for the
tribal violation and, additionally, for lack of an effective remedy in the tribal or federal
legal systems. The IACHR would likely recommend compensation and provision of an
effective remedy, and evaluate implementation of its recommendations. Tribal human
rights violations may arise in other contexts as well. The Linneen claimants were US
nationals, but foreign nationals could similarly find themselves subject to mistreatment
by a tribal officer potentially creating an international dispute for mistreatment of
aliens.
Although no international monitoring body has yet investigated human rights
violations by tribal governments, the US Commission for Civil Rights has
recommended that Congress establish extensive ICRA-reporting procedures to monitor
141
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the need for future amendments. Under its proposal the tribes must annually report the
disposition of all ICRA claims including the alleged violation, the tribal forum in which
the complaint was filed, the potential for appeal, and the types of remedies available.142
The reports would enable Congress to monitor the ‘success or shortcomings’ of the
Indian judicial systems, but Congress has not yet enacted such a reporting scheme.
President Clinton also established a body whose mandate included a review of tribal
human rights violations, but it has not issued any reports or recommendations.143

G CONCLUSION

US federal and state law largely reflects its international human rights obligations and
enables the federal and state judiciaries to fashion appropriate remedies where
individual rights are violated. The map of American human rights law, however,
contains substantive lacunae in legislative implementation against the American Indian
tribes, which have authority to engage in conduct that may constitute a breach of an
international human rights obligation of the US. Whilst the US represents to the HRC
that ‘[t]he Constitution greatly restricts the ability of the government at all levels to
infringe on the liberty of its citizens,’144 this is simply untrue in respect of tribal
governments, which are not bound by the constitutional protections. Procedural gaps
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also exist. Although the federal Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 superficially reflects
certain US international human rights obligations, most remedies for violations of the
Act are only available in tribal courts. Further, these tribal courts may deny claimants
access on the basis of tribal sovereign immunity.
Tribal violations of US international human rights obligations are attributable to
the US because the tribes are governmental entities within municipal law, and as such
fall under the rubric of State organs.

The US, therefore, commits an internationally

wrongful act whenever tribal conduct breaches an individual’s substantive rights
protected by international law and binding upon the US. Thus, the US can be held
internationally responsible for tribal acts it does not control and for which its judiciary
cannot fashion a remedy.
The disjuncture between US international human rights commitments and its
domestic implementation against tribes must be rectified: it is bound to adopt measures
to give effect to its international human rights obligations. No domestic legal obstacles
exist to federal legislation implementing international human rights obligations against
the tribes, because Congress retains plenary legislative power over them.145 To correct
the gaps identified in legislative implementation, ICRA must be revised to reflect fully
international human rights instruments binding on the US. Furthermore, to protect the
US from international responsibility, Congress should explicitly limit tribal sovereign
immunity in cases where individuals allege human rights violations, and give federal
courts the power to review tribal court decisions implicating substantive individual
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rights. The federal courts should also be given power to fashion remedies, including
compensation, for tribal human rights violations.
If the tribes wish to avoid further federal intrusion upon their independence, they
should incorporate US international human rights obligations into the tribal legal system
and carefully comply with the rights protected. This would require waiving tribal
sovereign immunity for suits against tribal officials alleged to have violated human
rights, and enabling tribal courts to develop appropriate remedies for such violations,
including compensation. Otherwise, a case like Linneen will eventually find its way to
an international monitoring body and the US will be declared responsible for the tribal
conduct. Such a decision would create intense domestic pressure for restrictions on
tribal independence and self-government.

Indications are that some tribes have

recognized the dilemma. The proposed Blackfoot Nation Constitution, for example,
incorporates international human rights protections.146 Other tribes, such as the Colville
Confederated Tribes, have incorporated international law as a source of law in its tribal
code.147
These developments should be encouraging for those who desire greater tribal
independence, but, unless the tribes remain vigilant and provide effective remedies for
alleged human rights violations, the potential exists for more intrusive federal
restrictions and oversight.
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